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Abstract
In 1995, the Social Security Administration started sending out the annual Social Security
Statement. It contains information about the worker’s estimated beneﬁts at the ages 62,
65, and 70. I use this unique natural experiment to analyze the retirement and claiming
decision making. First, I ﬁnd that, despite the previous availability of information, the
Statement has a signiﬁcant impact on workers’ knowledge about their beneﬁts. These
ﬁndings are consistent with a model where workers need to gather costly information
in order to improve their retirement decision. Second, I use this exogenous variation in
knowledge to analyze the optimality of workers’ decisions. Several ﬁndings suggest that
workers do not change their retirement behavior: i) Workers do not change their expected
age of retirement after receiving the Statement; ii) monthly claiming patterns do not show
any change after the introduction of the Social Security Statement; iii) workers do not
become more sensitive to Social Security incentives after receiving the Statement. More
research is needed to establish whether workers are already behaving optimally or they
are not, but the information contained in the Statement is not suﬃcient to improve their
retirement behavior.
Keywords: social Security statements, retirement expectations, retirement behavior, social
security incentives
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Many older workers know little about their retirement beneﬁts.1 In order to help workers make
provisions for their retirement, the Social Security Administration (SSA) introduced the Social
Security Statement in 1995. The Statement is a concise record of past earnings and a summary
of estimated beneﬁts as a function of diﬀerent retirement ages. It is mailed to all workers
paying payroll taxes, typically three months before their birthday. In 2008 the cost of sending
an individual Statement was only about 36 cents, but given the large number of Statements
sent each year, the total cost is 53 million dollars (?). This paper evaluates whether sending
the Statement increased workers’ knowledge and inﬂuenced retirement behavior. The more
general question is how workers make decisions, and to what extent these decisions change
when workers are provided with additional information.
In 1995 the SSA was required to mail the annual Statement—then named the Personal
Earnings and Beneﬁt Estimate Statement—to all workers age 60 and older and in later years it
has been sent out in phases. The stepwise introduction allows me to identify the eﬀect of the
Statement controlling for age and time. Using The Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) data,
I ﬁnd that workers aged 55 to 64 who received the Statement and had not previously contacted
SSA regarding their beneﬁts are 20 percentage points (50 percent) more likely to be able to
provide an estimate of their future beneﬁts than workers that did not receive the Statement.
While these are very large eﬀects, if workers were behaving optimally this additional in-
formation would not substantially change workers’ retirement or saving behavior. In contrast,
some workers might just be procrastinating: the cost of becoming informed and learning the
optimal retirement age and savings are borne upfront, while the corresponding utility gains are
received only sometime later. Workers with high discount rates should, therefore, seek infor-
mation later. For these workers, the Social Security Statement might actually induce changes
in behavior. I use three diﬀerent ways to measure changes in behavior. First, I look at whether
workers are more likely to update their retirement plans upon receiving a Statement. Then, I
check whether workers change their actual claiming behavior. Finally, I see whether workers
1See among others, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?.
2are more likely to respond to the retirement incentives provided by the Social Security beneﬁt
formula after receiving a Statement.2
I ﬁnd no evidence that receiving the ﬁrst Statement induces workers to update their expec-
tations. Social Security claiming patterns also show no change upon the introduction of the
Statement. Retirement decisions do not become more sensitive to Social Security incentives.
Overall, the results suggest that either workers were already behaving optimally or that the




Standard economic theory assumes that all agents base their retirement decisions on forward-
looking variables. ? provide a comprehensive survey of studies that modeled retirement be-
havior. These studies typically assume implicitly that workers know their future beneﬁts as a
function of their retirement age and are able to compare future streams of beneﬁts. Empirical
evidence, however, suggests that these are strong assumptions. When asked, only around 50
percent provide an estimate of their expected Social Security beneﬁts.3 ? show that fewer than
30 percent of respondents are able to estimate their future beneﬁts to within about
$1,500 per
year. Moreover, ? show that ﬁnancial illiteracy is widespread among older Americans. Only
half of the age 50+ respondents can correctly answer two simple questions regarding interest
compounding and inﬂation. Is it then reasonable to assume those same respondents are able to
compute their retirement incentives, which typically involve relatively complex calculations?
Despite the apparently little knowledge about retirement incentives, the fact that people
seem to respond to incentives when making their retirement decisions has been called by ? an
“important empirical puzzle in the retirement literature.” ? try to test the robustness of retire-
ment models when a measure of knowledge about beneﬁts is added to the retirement regression.
2The administrative records are used to compute retirement incentives (see, for example, ???).
3See ??. In my sample that focuses on workers aged 55 and above, two-thirds of workers are able to provide
an estimate.
3They ﬁnd that explicitly controlling for knowledge does not aﬀect workers’ responsiveness to
changes in the present value of the stream of Social Security beneﬁts from postponing retire-
ment, which are also called accruals. ? go one step further and analyze how the interaction of
knowledge and accruals aﬀects workers’ decisions. The authors ﬁnd that responsiveness to pen-
sion incentives is entirely driven by the 20 percent of workers who perceive them correctly.4 The
validity of using measures of knowledge in the regressions, however, is questionable as knowl-
edge is endogenous: workers gather information when they approach their expected retirement
age. Most workers contact the SSA in order to learn about their future Social Security beneﬁts.
Once they do so, the data show that they become more likely to provide a beneﬁt estimate,
and their estimate becomes more precise.5 This is not surprising. The SSA’s beneﬁt formula
is complicated, and workers would have a hard time trying to calculate their expected beneﬁts
without the SSA’s help. But this additional information is only valuable if individual workers
can use it and are unconstrained with respect to their retirement choice, i.e. workers who face
health problems or have liquidity constraints tend to retire as soon as possible. Consistent with
this, I ﬁnd that wealthier and healthier workers are signiﬁcantly more likely to get informed.
2.2 The Social Security Statement
Economists have not studied the introduction of Statements, apart from the Government Ac-
countability Oﬃce’s (GAO) evaluation of their understandability.6 Therefore, ? concluded
that: “Given the importance of Social Security beneﬁts to so many Americans, it is surprising
how little academic attention has been given to the content and implications of Social Security
beneﬁts” and “what is clear is that the Social Security Statement is one of the most important
communication that the federal government sends out to the general public each year, and as
such the document deserves much more attention from public oﬃcial and academic writers than
4They do not ﬁnd any link between knowledge and Social Security accruals, which they consider a result of
data limitations. A limitation of their test, and as a matter of fact, of mine as well, is that they can measure if
workers correctly perceive their Social Security beneﬁts, but not if they correctly compute their forward-looking
Social Security incentives, like the present-discounted stream of beneﬁts.
5? show that having contacted the SSA is the strongest predictor for being knowledgeable about Social
Security beneﬁts.
6See GAO/T-HEHS-96-210, GAO/HEHS-97-19, GAO/HEHS-98-228, GAO/T-HEHS-00-101, GAO-05-192
on www.gao.gov.
4it has received to date.” According to the GAO reports the overall public reaction to receiv-
ing an unsolicited Statement has been favorable. The reports cite a nationally representative
survey in which, as predicted by ?, “the majority of the respondents indicated they were glad
to receive their Statements and 95 percent of them said the information provided was helpful
to their families.” The April 2005 report ﬁnds that 66 percent of workers remember receiv-
ing a Statement (unfortunately they do not provide this number by age groups), and that 90
percent of those who remember receiving a Statement say that they remember the amount of
estimated Social Security beneﬁts. The results of a Gallup survey revealed that individuals who
had received a Statement had a signiﬁcantly increased basic understanding of Social Security,
and understanding of some important basic features of Social Security: the amount of Social
Security beneﬁts depends on how much people earned; Social Security pays beneﬁts to workers
who become disabled; Social Security provides beneﬁts to dependents of workers who die (see
http://www.ssa.gov/.) According to the 2004 Retirement Conﬁdence Survey, 80 percent of
workers use retirement beneﬁt Statements (not necessarily only Social Security Statements)
and 20 percent ﬁnd them the most helpful tool in retirement and claiming decision making
(?). Jackson analyzes the content of the Social Security Statement, and reports how because
of various cognitive biases workers may misinterpret the value of their beneﬁts. He then sug-
gests that including the present discounted value of Social Security beneﬁts may facilitate the
comparison with other sources of income and minimize labor market distortions.
3 Exogenous Variation in Knowledge
3.1 The Phasing In Schedule of the Statement
The administration started sending the Statements in 1995. The main purpose is to inform
the public about beneﬁts under SSA programs, to aid in ﬁnancial planning, and to ensure the
worker’s earnings records are complete and accurate. The Statement contains expected Social
Security beneﬁts at the early (62), the normal (usually 65, though increasing since 2003), and
the late (70) retirement age as well as the worker’s entire earnings history. The Statement
5also informs workers about spouse’s beneﬁts, survivors’ beneﬁts, and disability beneﬁts.7 The
Statement does not report the present discounted value of these beneﬁts, also called the Social
Security Wealth (SSW).
The SSA was required to mail the annual Statement—then named the Personal Earnings
and Beneﬁt Estimate Statement—to all workers age 60 and older. In later years it has been sent
according to the following (year, age) combinations: (1996, 58+), (1997, 53+), (1998, 47+),
(1999, 44+), (2000, 25+). Workers usually receive their Statement one month before their
birthdays.8 This seems to be a good timing since 65 percent of all workers claim immediately
after their birthdays (15 percent of the claims occur in January and the remaining workers
tend to claim uniformly across the year). Later I show that apart from age and year no other
observable characteristics of workers are able to predict the receipt of a Statement. Conditional
on age and year eﬀects it is as if it was randomly assigned. With precise information on the date
of the HRS surveys and on the date of birth of the respondents and with internal documents
of the SSA, I reconstruct the exact same schedule used by the Social Security Administration
to send out the letters. The introductory schedule was based on ﬁscal years, which start in
October, and workers born in the same year may or may not have received a Statement when the
Statements were ﬁrst send out, depending on whether they were born before or after October. I
will later exploit this variation within birth cohorts together with variation in the interview date
across survey respondents to set up a quasi-experiment of retirement behavior. The treatment
is going to be receiving a Social Security Statement.
3.2 The Statement’s “Treatment”
Assuming that getting informed is costly, a worker will acquire new information about his
retirement beneﬁts when, based on his prior over the whole distribution of his retirement
beneﬁts (which are function of the retirement age he/she believes that the expected gains of
information outweigh the cost of information. Intuitively, information matters when better
7In the Appendix provide a sample of the Social Security Statement. Earlier versions of the Statement can
be found in reports by the GAO, although they changed little over time.
8In 2000 the SSA started sending the Statement three months before the worker’s birthday.
6knowledge about the beneﬁts can inﬂuence retirement or consumption, in other words, when
variation in beneﬁt patterns generate variations in utility. If, for example, the prior is such
that the worker strongly believes that it is optimal to retire as soon as possible, it might not be
optimal for him to collect additional information. Factors that can generate such a boundary
solution are high discount rates, high disutility from work (like health issues), high mortality,
and low risk aversion. Moreover, workers need to be able to evaluate their retirement incentives,
which are complicated functions of their beneﬁts and of their family status. Financially illiterate
workers, unable to compute those incentives, might also choose not to get informed.
The main eﬀect of the Statement is to considerably reduce the cost of information, which
should help workers to make better retirement choices. But if workers select into the unknowl-
edgeable state, changes in retirement behavior are expected to be lower than in a situation
where knowledge was randomly assigned. I focus on retirement and claiming behavior as later
in life workers can hardly inﬂuence their entitlements in any other way.
It is important to note that workers have always had the option to ask the SSA to compute
their expected beneﬁts (it would usually take 4 to 6 weeks to receive an estimate). Before
the Statements started circulating according to the HRS around 50 percent of the respondents
would contact the SSA by age 62. Workers could either call a 1800 number, or visit one of
the many local SSA oﬃces (across States there is one oﬃce every 200-300 thousand inhabi-
tants). According to the HRS, contacting the administration had an enormous eﬀect on the
(unconditional) probability of providing a Social Security beneﬁt estimate, almost doubling the
probability of providing a beneﬁt estimate from 46 to 88 percent. Before analyzing the eﬀect
of the Statement it is therefore important to analyze the selection issue (calling the SSA for
a beneﬁt estimate). Appendix A contains a description of the data and for the corresponding
summary statistics.
Column (1) in Table 1 shows that, apart from age (multiplied by 1/2 for a reason that
will be clear shortly), the three strongest predictors for contacting the SSA are the level of
education, race, and wealth. Having less than a high school degree and being black, reduce the
probability of contacting the SSA by 11 and 8 percentage points. Consistent with the theory,
7wealthier workers, therefore workers that are less likely to be liquidity constrained, are more
likely to contact the SSA. The eﬀects are very large. Compared to workers that are in the ﬁrst
wealth quartile, workers with wealth above the median are 18 to 22 percentage points more
likely to contact the SSA. Healthy workers are, compared to workers in fair and poor health,
more likely to contact the SSA.
In column (2) I additionally control for variables that are not available for the whole sample.
While more experienced workers are signiﬁcantly more likely to contact the SSA, the coeﬃcient
on the subjective life-expectancy is not signiﬁcant.9 Since the SSA’s actuarial adjustments for
postponing retirement are based on the average life-expectancy workers with a low subjective
life–expectancy should be less likely to get informed if they know that they should follow the
simple rule of retiring and claiming the beneﬁts as soon as possible. On the other hand, workers
with a high life–expectancy should do the opposite, claim as late as possible (70). Checking for
non-linearities does reveal that workers in the ﬁrst and the last quartile of the distribution of
subjective life–expectancy are less likely to get informed, but the eﬀects are not signiﬁcant.10
Around 35 percent of workers age 65 receive a private pension. The incentives of getting
informed might diﬀer by whether workers receive a pension or participate in a deﬁned beneﬁt or
deﬁned contribution plan, both because pensions change the liquidity constraint and because
pensions change the overall retirement incentives. Receiving a pension and participating in a
pension plan do not signiﬁcantly change the probability of contacting the SSA, even when I
focus on those who do not yet receive a pension income.11
The respondents ﬁnancial planning time horizon, information available from the HRS’s ﬁrst
wave, is another good predictor of contacting the SSA. How far in advance workers are planning
is certainly related to their time preference and consistent with this I ﬁnd that the longer the
planning time horizon the more likely it is workers contact the SSA. It is important to notice
that even after controlling for health, wealth, mortality, and proxies of time preference workers
9The subjective life–expectancy is measured as the self-reported probability of surviving age 75 divided by
the implied probability from the Vital Statistics life tables that someone of the respondent’s age and gender
will live to be 75.
10Results available upon request.
11Results available upon request.
8without a high school degree are 10 percentage points less likely to contact the SSA. In the last
column I additionally control for occupation ﬁxed eﬀects, which does not change these results.
Summing up, workers who didn’t contact the SSA before the introduction of the Statement
tend to be younger, with lower levels of education, in poor health, poor, with less labor market
experience, and less likely to plan many years in advance. Next I show that these workers are
more likely to improve their knowledge about their beneﬁts upon receiving a Statement, which
is consistent with the idea that information is costly.
3.3 The Eﬀect of the Statement on Workers’ Knowledge about Re-
tirement Beneﬁts
In all HRS waves workers are asked about their expected retirement age and their expected
Social Security beneﬁts. In the absence of any informational cost we would expect the Statement
to have a negligible eﬀect on workers’ knowledge.
Column (1) in Table 2 shows the eﬀect of the Statement on the probability of reporting
Social Security beneﬁts,12 estimated using a linear probability model. Thirty-four percent of
workers aged between 55 and 65 do not report a beneﬁt estimate. I control for age ﬁxed eﬀects,
year, gender, level of education, marital status, race, and labor market experience (number of
years with positive earnings). The introduction of the Statement reduces the probability of not
reporting an estimate by 6.25 percentage points. Controlling also for year, wealth and health
ﬁxed eﬀects (column 2) the reduction is equal to 4.48. This 15 percent drop in the probability of
being uniformed can be interpreted as an average treatment eﬀect. Being black and not having
a high school degree are both very strong predictors for not knowing the future amount of the
beneﬁts. But some workers that didn’t contact the SSA before receiving the Statement might
have contacted the administration later on, showing an improvement that I am now attributing
to the Statement.
In order to evaluate this bias let me deﬁne the event “contacting SSA” as C ∈ {0,1} and
“not being able to provide an estimate” as N ∈ {0,1}. I need to estimate the improvement in
12The dependent variable is equal to one when workers respond that they “don’t know” their Social Security
beneﬁts. The very few workers who refuse to respond are not included in the regressions.
9Pr(N = 1) that would have happened independently of the Statement T ∈ {0,1} over the time
distance t between HRS surveys (2 years):
Pr(Nt = 1|Ct−2 = 0,T = 0) − Pr(Nt−2 = 1|Ct−2 = 0,T = 0). (1)
Conditioning on T = 0, by the law of total probability:
Pr(Nt = 1|Ct−2 = 0) = Pr(Nt = 1|Ct = 0)Pr(Ct = 0|Ct−2 = 0)
+Pr(Nt = 1|Ct = 1)Pr(Ct = 1|Ct−2 = 0). (2)
One way to estimate the probability that a worker contacts the administration within a
2-year period Pr(Ct = 1|Ct−2 = 0) is to use the cross–sectional information using age as a
measure of time. Our estimate of Pr(Ct = 1|Ct−2 = 0) is going to be equal to the coeﬃcient on
age from Table 1. Age is multiplied by 1/2 in order to estimate the probability over a 2-year
period.
Although I don’t know Pr(Nt = 1|Ct = 1) = E(Nt|Ct = 1) and Pr(Nt = 1|Ct = 0) =
E(Nt|Ct = 0) for the years after 1994, I can estimate these probabilities using data from the
1992 and 1994 waves assuming that the probability of contacting SSA and the eﬀects from
contacting SSA wouldn’t have changed over time. Given these assumptions the overstatement
of the eﬀect of the Statement for workers who didn’t contact SSA is approximately equal to 3
percentage points (approximately 30 percent) when using data up to 1996:
[E(Nt−2|Ct−2 = 1) − E(Nt−2|Ct−2 = 0)]P(Ct = 1|Ct−2 = 0) = 0.27 × 0.08 = 0.02. (3)
The overall eﬀect would thus be biased by this amount times the fraction of workers who
did not contact the administration (0.02 × 0.66 = 0.014, again a 30 percent bias).
I estimate a regression model with known probabilities of misclassiﬁcation of the variable C
in order to use the whole data set, and reach a similar conclusion. Deﬁning C∗ as the true event
and C as the misclassiﬁed one, the true eﬀect of the Statement for group x is proportional to
10the misclassiﬁed one
[E (N|C = 0,T = x) − E (N|C = 1,T = x)]
= [E(N|C
∗ = 0,T = x) − E(N|C
∗ = 1,T = x)]
×Pr(C
∗ = 0|C = 0), x = 0,1 (4)
where the factor of proportionality is the probability of correctly classifying 1−C. Controlling
for other X’s, it can be shown that the estimated true eﬀect of the Statement is equal to b β11
in the following linear model:13
N = β00 + β01 (1 − C)Pr(C
∗ = 0|C = 0,X) + β10T1
+β11 (1 − C)Pr(C
∗ = 0|C = 0,X)T1 + X
0γ + ￿. (5)
This is the speciﬁcation used from column (3) of Table 2 on, where I interact the probability
of not having contacted the SSA and the post–Statement variable. This way I measure the
treatment eﬀect on the treated, and indeed the entire eﬀect of the Statement is concentrated
among those who never contacted the SSA (66 percent of the sample). Columns (3) and (4)
show that not having contacted the SSA increases the initial probability of not reporting an
estimate in the pre–Statement period by 26 percentage points, a large eﬀect.
For those that don’t contact the SSA, the Statement reduces the probability of not reporting
an estimate by 10 percentage points, approximately one third of the initial diﬀerence. Column
(4) shows that controlling for year, health and wealth does not change the estimated eﬀects of
the Statement.14
The last two columns of Table 2 report a placebo regression where I simulate the introduction
13In order to control for the variation that is due to the ﬁrst step, I can either use a modiﬁed version of ?’s
two-step estimator that accounts for the panel structure (dependence over time), or I can simply bootstrap
clusters of individuals and than run the ﬁrst and second step. Since doing so has negligible eﬀects on the
standard errors (mainly due to the precision of the estimate of Pr(Ct = 1|Ct−2 = 0,X)), the analysis is carried
out conditional on the estimate from the ﬁrst stage.
14The results are not diﬀerent when, disregarding an endogeneity problem, I also control for the time left
from the expected retirement date (results available upon request).
11of the Statement with a lag of exactly four years. The sample is based on HRS respondents
that already received a Statement. Not controlling for year, wealth and health ﬁxed eﬀects the
placebo coeﬃcient is negative, while controlling for those ﬁxed eﬀects the coeﬃcient becomes
positive. In both regressions the coeﬃcient is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, suggesting
that simple trends are not driving the “treatment” results.
The eﬀect on knowledge could be diﬀerent at diﬀerent ages, and thus could have very
diﬀerent eﬀects on retirement behavior. The eﬀect of the Statement might be concentrated at
younger ages with small potential of changing retirement behavior. In order to capture how
the Statement can diﬀerently aﬀect diﬀerent age groups, the ﬁrst column in Table 3 reports for
each age the fraction of workers who have contacted the SSA. Since almost all workers claim
by age 65, the table is truncated at age 64. Most workers contact the SSA when they are close
to retirement. Around 30 percent call in their 50s, while an additional 20 percent call when
they approach the early retirement age.
In the remaining columns of Table 3, I analyze how at diﬀerent ages the probability of
reporting a beneﬁt estimate changes upon receiving a Statement.15 The sample is split into
those who did and those who didn’t contact the SSA (using again a model with misclassiﬁcation
errors and known probabilities of misclassiﬁcation). Among those who contacted the SSA there
is a clear reduction in the probability of not reporting an estimate as they approach the early
retirement age. There is no such pattern for those who didn’t contact the SSA in the pre–
Statement period. In the post–Statement period, there is a clear improvement around the
early retirement age. The eﬀect of the introduction of the Statement can be seen by looking
at the Pre − Post columns. Among those who contacted the SSA most diﬀerences are not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. On the other hand, among workers who didn’t contact the
SSA, the Statement reduced the fraction of workers that are unable to provide an estimate
by around 10 percentage points up to age 58 and 20 percentage points afterwards. In relative
terms, the eﬀect around the early retirement age is to reduce the fraction of workers that are
15I performed a similar analysis using instead of age the expected number of remaining years from retirement,
and the results were very similar.
12unable to provide a beneﬁt estimate by almost one half.16 After age 58 the diﬀerences are
signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level (except at age 64 where the sample size is also very small).
Next, I analyze whether the Statement improves the estimates of those who provide an
estimate. Figure 1 shows the density of the forecast error (the diﬀerence between the expected
and the actual beneﬁts) for those workers who did and didn’t contact the SSA.17 18 The upper
ﬁgures are unconditional errors, while the lower ones are residual errors after conditioning on
year, age, age squared, gender, marital status, race, and educational attainment. Errors seem
to be approximately distributed symmetrically around zero, which suggests that, on average,
there is no prediction bias. In the pre-Statement period (solid line) the variability of the errors
for workers who didn’t contact the SSA is much larger than for those who contacted the SSA;
this diﬀerence seems to disappear once the Statement is introduced (dashed line). As before,
this change in the distribution of the error term is likely to be slightly upward biased by the
fact that some workers would have contacted the SSA in the absence of the Statement.
I can judge the expected improvement that is not attributable to the Statement (dotted
line) by plotting the corresponding pre-Statement density, substituting, with probability equal
to the probability of contacting the SSA over a two-year period, workers who didn’t contact
the SSA with workers who contacted the SSA.19
In Table 4, I test whether the distributional diﬀerences in Figure 1 are signiﬁcant. For
workers who didn’t contact the SSA I use the pre–Statement density that controls for the
expected improvements (dashed line). Most of the improvement seems to lie within one standard
deviation from the mean, which is why I test if the ratio of the pre–Statement to the post–
16The eﬀect at even earlier ages are small. Workers in their 40s and early 50s are only 3-6 percentage points
more likely to provide an estimate as a consequence of receiving the Statement (results available upon request).
This casts some doubt on the utility of sending the Statements to young workers that seem to show little interest
for them.
17Beneﬁts are expressed in 2003 dollars using the CPI. The expected beneﬁts refer to what the worker would
get at his expected retirement age. The actual beneﬁts are computed using what workers actually ended up
receiving in later waves. Using actual beneﬁts computed using the administrative records gives similar results.
I take into account that actual Social Security beneﬁts refer to the year before the interview. Results using the
relative forecast error are similar.
18Note that to highlight the distributional diﬀerences I truncated the distribution of the error at ±$1000 (3
percent of the sample).
19These graphs use only information up to 1996 and therefore the probability is simply equal to 8 percent.
13Statement variance is larger than one, truncating the error at ±$1000, ±$500, and ±$300.20
The p-value of this one-sided test for those who didn’t contact the SSA is zero for the $1000
truncation and close to zero as I concentrate the analysis to errors that are closer to the median.
For those who contacted the SSA I can reject the hypothesis that the variance decreased after
the introduction of the Statement. It is worth noting that although the variance of the forecast
error decreased for those who were previously uninformed, similarly to what I observed before
for the probability of reporting an estimate, their post Statement errors are still larger compared
to the other group.
The above analysis suggests that thanks to the Statement some workers became more knowl-
edgeable about their Social Security beneﬁts. Workers who received a Statement because they
contacted the administration before 1995 do not show improvements or reductions in knowl-
edge, which suggests that the automated Statements do not contain more or less information
compared to the ones the administration would mail once contacted.
Workers who didn’t contact the administration, instead, show improvements in knowledge.
The proﬁle of those workers is consistent with the idea that information is costly. Controlling for
various factors reduces the diﬀerence due to educational and gender by about one third. While
the remaining diﬀerences could be due to diﬀerent preferences over leisure, another possible
reason might be ﬁnancial illiteracy.21
The important lesson is that the free availability of information is not suﬃcient to get
informed. Obtaining information seems to be costly and might prevent workers who think
that information is of little value to become knowledgeable. Stimulating workers by directly
providing them with information reduces that cost and has the predictable eﬀect of improving
workers’ knowledge. In the ﬁrst waves the HRS asked only about expected beneﬁts at the
expected retirement age and does not ask about expected retirement incentives, thus I cannot
tell whether the additional knowledge about beneﬁts does indeed translate into additional
20The reason to use truncated values is that variances are highly sensitive to outliers. Without truncation
the variance of the error is even larger in the pre–Statement period. In the HRS, respondents can report
weekly, monthly, biyearly, and yearly values. The big discrepancies seem to be due to the few observations with
measurement errors in the variable that reports this “frequency” variable.
21Another explanation may be that some workers prefer to procrastinate ?.
14knowledge about retirement incentives.
In the next section, I test whether and how the new information aﬀects workers’ retirement
decisions.
4 The Eﬀect of the Statement on Retirement and Social
Security Beneﬁt Claiming Behavior
The additional information provided by the Statement can inﬂuence workers’ behavior in many
ways. There may be a “surprise” eﬀect: workers who overestimated their expected Social
Security beneﬁts should react by working and saving more, while those who underestimated
their beneﬁts should do the opposite. Although changes in labor supply may also happen at the
intensive level (hours), I focus on changes at the extensive level (participation). Since forecast
errors are approximately symmetrically distributed around zero, these changes may go in both
directions. Also, as over time the age at which workers received their ﬁrst Statement decreases,
I should expect these “surprise” eﬀects to weaken. In addition, even if the decision of becoming
informed is the sole product of a maximization process with costly information, at the margin
the Statement should strengthen the link between Social Security incentives and retirement.
Because of liquidity constraints and the earnings test (earnings above given thresholds re-
duce current Social Security beneﬁts), the retirement decision is strongly related to the claiming
decision. According to the HRS data, half of the time the monthly self-reported retirement date
and the monthly self-reported claiming date are not more than 12 months apart from each other.
When the diﬀerence between the two dates is larger than one year, the diﬀerence is mainly due
to early retirement. Among those who retire at or after age 62, 75 percent claim and retire
within a year.
4.1 Social Security Claiming
Most workers claim at the “Early” and the “Normal” retirement age. Liquidity constraints
can explain the spike at age 62 while the other spike is more puzzling, and some economists
have suggested that workers may use the NRA as a focal point (?). Another surprising fact
15that cannot be easily explained by the incentives is that workers are more likely to claim
their beneﬁts within a month of their birthday than just the month before or the month after
that period. In particular, they are 20 percent more likely at age 63, 64, and 66 and, less
surprisingly, multiple times more likely at age 62 and at the NRA. If the Statement improves
workers’ understanding of the Social Security incentives they should become less likely to claim
at these particular ages. I use the SSA’s Master Beneﬁciary Records (1 percent of all retirees)
to test whether after receiving a Statement workers become less likely to claim within a month
of their date of birth, separately by age.
Figure 2 shows the probability of claiming the Social Security beneﬁts within a month of age
62 (upper-left panel), age 63, 64, or 66 (upper-right panel), Normal Retirement Age (lower-left
panel), and age 70 (lower-right panel), both before and after the introduction of the Social
Security Statement.22 All the panels show that there is a tendency for people to claim the
beneﬁts in January, but there is no discontinuity in the claiming patterns when the Statements
are introduced.
It might still be that workers changed their claiming behavior due to the Statements, but
that these changes cancel out in the aggregate due to the symmetry around zero of the beneﬁts’
forecast errors. The next step is to evaluate the impact that the Statement had on retirement
using individual data.
4.2 Retirement
4.2.1 Social Security Incentives
Postponing retirement by one year can generate considerable changes in SSW (the SSW ac-
crual). Positive accruals generate an incentive to work. Figure ?? shows that there are two
pronounced retirement rate spikes: at the early retirement age (ERA) and at the Normal Re-
tirement Age (NRA). Around 17 percent of people retire at the age of 62, and among those who
do not claim before age 65, 20 percent retire at age 65. Some factors can partially explain this
22In response to an earlier “crisis” in Social Security ﬁnancing two decades ago, the US Congress implemented
both a reduction in the Normal Retirement Age (NRA) of two months per year for cohorts born in 1938 and
afterward, and, staring in 1986, an increase in the delayed retirement credit (?).
16clustering: large disutility from work and/or a large discount rate (ERA spike) and disconti-
nuities in the actuarial adjustment rates (NRA spike) (??). ? attribute part of the 62-spike to
liquidity constraints and part of the 65-spike to lock-in eﬀects due to Medicare when workers
lack alternative health insurance in retirement.23
In order to analyze whether the Statement makes workers more responsive to Social Security
incentives I ﬁrst need to compute these incentives. Thus I need to forecast earnings and compute
future beneﬁts as a function of the retirement age. Below I brieﬂy review the main provisions
of the beneﬁt formula and the assumptions needed to compute the Social Security Wealth.
I compute the Social Security beneﬁts Bt(a) for each retirement age using the same assump-
tions used by the SSA to provide an estimate in the Statement. The Statement assumes that
if the worker doesn’t retire he/she is likely to earn the same amount he/she earned last year
(or the year before if last year’s earnings are zero). In other words, real earnings are assumed
to follow a random walk, so that the previous year’s earnings are the best predictor for future
earnings. This assumption is not very diﬀerent from ?, who assume that real earnings are
expected to grow by one percent. Every year, beneﬁts are then computed as a function of age
(from age 55 to 70) and as a function of the retirement age (from the worker’s actual age to age
70). The beneﬁt rules are held constant, and it is assumed that promised beneﬁts are going to
be paid. Workers who retire before age 62 are assumed to claim at age 62.
I do not model the spouse’s retirement decision, and I assume that the spouse claims at the
earliest possible age.24 The Statement explains what spouse beneﬁts, and survivors beneﬁts
are, but it doesn’t provide an estimate of these beneﬁts. I estimate retirement models with
and without taking into account these additional beneﬁts and the results are generally very
similar. I deﬁne a spouse as “independent” when his/her own beneﬁts at age 62 are larger than
23Their explanation is at odds, however, with the evidence from the 1961 change in the early retirement age
from 65 to 62. While the ERA has changed suddenly, the spike in retirement has moved very slowly (over 30
years, ?). Based on this evidence, ? suggest that spikes may not be entirely the product of rational decision
making but resemble some herd behavior. Additional support for a behavioral explanation of the spikes is
provided by the recent increase in the NRA suggested by the 1983 Greenspan Commission. ? shows that
the entire 65-spike at which the workers claim their Social Security beneﬁts moved together with NRA. This
contradicts the Medicare explanation as the Medicare eligibility at age 65 remained unchanged. The Social
Security Statement contains the advice that, “even if you do not retire at age 65, be sure to contact Social
Security three months before your 65th birthday to enroll in Medicare.”
24Most of the times it is age 62, which also represents the median claiming age.
1750 percent of her spouse’s beneﬁts at age 62.
Beneﬁts are a function of the weighted average of the highest 35 years of average wage-
indexed earnings, called the AIME. Since workers tend to have lower earnings at the beginning
of their career than at the end working an additional year normally increases future beneﬁts
even at age 62, which generates an additional incentive to work. However, between age 55
and 61 the increase in Social Security beneﬁts is modest. Its median ranges between 1 percent
and 2 percent. Starting at age 62 instead, the increase is substantial, since the approximately
8 percent per year actuarial adjustment kicks in. Looking at beneﬁts only doesn’t take into
account that working an additional year means that beneﬁts are not collected in that year,
and that Social Security taxes are paid on the additional earnings up to the maximum taxable
threshold. This is clearly stated in the Statement but the Statement does not provide workers
with estimates of this intertemporal trade-oﬀ. This is why later in the regression I use the
simple increase in the beneﬁts as the most naive form of Social Security incentives.
More forward-looking incentives depend on the number of years that workers, and possibly
their spouses, expect to collect beneﬁts. It also depends on their discount rate. The SSW is a
function of time t and retirement age a:





Following the literature I use a real discount rate of 3 percent (β = 1.03).25 Bt(a)’s are expressed
in 2003 dollars using the CPI, and the conditional probabilities of survival, pt(s), are based on
the SSA’s cohort-speciﬁc life tables.26 In a second set of regressions, that are available upon
25There is some evidence that discount rates may actually be larger than 3 percent (?). On the other hand,
? argue that in the absence of borrowing constraints it is more appropriate to use a real interest rate instead,
which can be assumed to be very low (they use 1 percent). I follow the mainstream literature and use a 3
percent discount rate, though the reduced form model estimated controlling for age seems to be robust to the
use of diﬀerent discount rates. The reason is that controlling for age the eﬀect of the accrual is mostly identiﬁed
by the accrual’s cross-sectional variation within age, while the use of diﬀerent discount rates generates mainly
large diﬀerences across age.
26The life tables are prepared by the Oﬃce of the Chief Actuary in the Social Security Administration.
Projected death rates and life tables are based on Alternative II forecasts for the 1998 Trustees report (taken
from the Berkeley Mortality Database). To compute total Social Security beneﬁts (including spouse’s beneﬁts
and survivors’ beneﬁts) when using the tables I’m implicitly assuming that the couple’s individual mortalities
are independent.
18request because the results are very similar, I correct the probabilities of survival for the ratio
between the subjective probability of surviving age 75 and the same probability taken from the
life tables.27
Because I lack precise information on dependent children, the beneﬁts include dependent
beneﬁts and survivors’ beneﬁts, related only to the spouse. In that case pt(s) is a column vector
where the entries are: the probability that only the worker survives, the probability that only
his wife survives, and the probability that both survive. Bt(a) is a row vector containing the
worker’s own beneﬁts, the survivors’s beneﬁts, and the sum of the worker’s own beneﬁts and
the dependent spouse’s beneﬁts.
The Social Security accrual is the expected gain in SSW from waiting an additional year
before retiring and claiming Social Security beneﬁts,28
ACCt(a) = SSWt(a + 1) − SSWt(a), (7)
while the peak-value (PV) ? is the diﬀerence between the maximum SSW and the current SSW,
PVt(a) = max
x SSWt(x) − SSWt(a). (8)
Retirement decisions based on PV’s and ACC’s diﬀer whenever ACC’s are not monotonic
relative to the retirement age. I also compute relative incentives, ACCt(a)/SSWt(a), and
PVt(a)/SSWt(a). For this reason the sample is restricted to workers with positive Social
Security Wealth. If workers are below age 62 and retire, the Social Security Wealth is equal to
the Social Security Wealth they will get at age 62 discounted to their age.
I compute the accrual net of Social Security taxes, tWt(a), assuming, like in ?, that workers
bear the entire payroll tax, t (12.4 percent since 1990). Since I do not observe income I do not
attempt to try to simulate income taxes, though in the regressions the diﬀerent tax treatment
of Social Security beneﬁts should in part be absorbed by the coeﬃcient on earnings.29
27The RAND version of the HRS contains this variable, called “rliv75r.”
28I assume that workers claim and retire in the same year.




$44,000) in 2004, he or she pays taxes on 50 percent of the Social Security
beneﬁts. If the combined income is more than
$34,000 (
$44,000), up to 85 percent of the Social Security beneﬁts
19There is heterogeneity in accruals (in thousands) over age and within age from postponing
retirement. Part of it is due to the eligibility to diﬀerent types of beneﬁts (i.e., dependent
spouse’s beneﬁts). Diﬀerences in earnings histories, current earnings, and Social Security rules
account for the rest. Individuals, especially men, who evaluate the future streams of Social
Security beneﬁts taking only their own beneﬁts into consideration (either because they have no
dependents, or because their spouses are better oﬀ by claiming their own beneﬁts) generally
face negative or null increases in SSW from additional work. The summary statistics of all the
diﬀerent incentives used are shown in Table 5.
4.2.2 A Measurement Error Model of Optimal Retirement Behavior
Reduced form models of retirement have been used extensively in the retirement literature. ?
estimate a probit reduced form model of retirement that incorporates forward-looking Social
Security incentives. Their concept is based on the Option Value model of ?, a model that
resembles a dynamic programming model although it introduces some important simpliﬁcations.
Accruals tend to be decreasing with age except between ages 61 and 62. Since workers may be
forward-looking and incorporate future accruals in their retirement decisions ? and numerous
papers that follow their approach use the peak value as the main measure of Social Security
incentives. All of these papers use reduced form PV probits, and assume a constant coeﬃcient
on the PV.30
I estimate the following linear probability model,
Ri = αiACCi + β
0˜ xi + ￿i, (9)
where R is equal to one when workers report being retired and zero otherwise, ACC is some sort
of Social Security incentive to retire, and ˜ x denotes the other regressor, including the earnings
(y).31 The model estimates hazard rates as workers are excluded from the sample once they
retire.
are subject to income tax.
30?, instead, use a more structural approach and assume that workers respond diﬀerently to incentives de-
pending on their health, age, and year of birth.
31Results based on probit regressions are very similar.
20First, I assume that αi is constant across people and independent of the Statement T ∈
{0,1}, while later I allow αi to vary between the pre and the post-Statement period:
αi = α0 + α1Ti. (10)
α0 is the eﬀect of the accrual for workers in the pre–Statement period.
Substituting αi into Eq. (9) I get,
Ri = [α0 + α1Ti]ACCi + β
0˜ xi + ￿i. (11)
In this setup, α1 represents the diﬀerence between the post– and the pre–Statement period in
the marginal eﬀect of a unit (
$1,000) increase in the accrual on the probability of retirement:
α1 =
∂P (R = 1)
∂ACC
|Ti=1 −
∂P (R = 1)
∂ACC
|Ti=0. (12)
In order to control for changes in retirement behavior that may be due to the earnings test
(ET), I include the average ET tax.32 The average average tax is 6 percent, but less that 10
percent of workers would be subject to it. The average average tax among workers with a
positive tax is 75 percent. The taxed beneﬁts are after being actuarially adjusted added to
the worker’s future beneﬁts once he stops working. A higher average tax would thus inﬂuence
worker’s retirement in one direction only if he does no take into account the increased future
beneﬁts. Table 8 in the Appendix shows the summary statistics for the sample used in the
regressions.
All regressions control for the SSW, the SSW of the spouse when she is independent, an
independent spouse dummy, the labor force status of the spouse, age dummies, year, year
squared, a post–Statement dummy, the level of education, marital status, the own and the
spouse’s real AIME at age 55, subjective health status dummies, the diﬀerence in age relative
32The average ET tax, based on potential earnings, is tET = min(benefits,(potentialearnings −
ETthreshold) × ETtax)/benefits. When potential earnings fall below the ET threshold, the marginal tax
and the average tax are zero. Special rules apply the ﬁrst year a worker claims his beneﬁts. Under these rules,
a worker can use a monthly test amount. If she claims and retires during the year, she can get a full Social
Security check for any whole month he/she is retired, regardless of his yearly earnings. Since I do not have
information on monthly earnings I cannot control for this case, which is why the average tax may be measured
with some error.
21to the spouse, a no children in the household dummy, veteran status, experience, occupation
and industry dummies, and forecasted earnings.
If the researcher observes the true accrual ACC, but workers base their decisions on their
perceived and sometimes mismeasured accrual [ ACC, the estimated eﬀect will be downward
biased (relative to workers’ actual intentions). The bias will be higher the higher the variance
of measurement error V ar( [ ACC − ACC). If the Statement allows workers to get a better
estimate not only of their Social Security beneﬁts but also of their retirement incentives and
this better estimate is used to make better retirement decision, the variance would decrease,
reducing this “classical-type” measurement error bias. The coeﬃcients in the post-Statement
period would thus in absolute value be larger than in the pre-Statement period.
4.2.3 Results
Let me ﬁrst discuss the sample that I use for the regressions. The Statement has been sent
out in phases, depending on the age, the ﬁscal year, and the date of birth of workers. This
means that workers born in the same year might have started receiving a Statement in diﬀerent
years. I exploit these discontinuities in the phasing in together with the variation in the date of
interview of the HRS respondents to select a sample of age in years/year of birth combinations
where at least some, but not all individuals in an ge in years/year of birth group receive a
Statement. Table 6 shows the age/year of birth combinations for the HRS linked to the SSA
records. The combinations that have at least some but not all workers receiving a Statement
are shown in bold. Of this sample 56 percent of individuals receive a Statement. Table 8 shows
that controlling for age dummies, year, and year squared almost all other regressors do not on
average diﬀer between the pre and the post-Statement period.33 This shows that the treatment
and control group have on average similar characteristics.
In Table 7 each column represents an empirical speciﬁcation with a diﬀerent Social Security
incentive. The ﬁrst column shows the results for the ratio between the earliest beneﬁts the
worker would receive retiring in the following year and the earliest beneﬁts the worker would
receive retiring immediately. In order to estimate this kind of incentives workers do not have to
33Around 5 percent of the coeﬃcients should turn out to be signiﬁcant even if the true eﬀect was zero.
22compute present discounted values. Most of the information needed to compute this incentive
is available in the Statement. As in Eq. 11, I allow k to be diﬀerent between the pre and the
post-Statement period. In the pre-Statement period increasing the beneﬁts by 1 percentage
point decreases the self-reported retirement hazard by 0.52 percentage points. The diﬀerence
between the Post and Pre period coeﬃcient is -11 percentage points (-20 percent compared to
the pre Statement eﬀect), with a standard error of 23 percent. Column 2 shows that using
the percentage accrual gives, surprisingly, similar results. Measuring accruals in levels tells us
that a
$1,000 increase in the accrual decreases the hazard rate of retiring by 0.49 percentage
points, while a similar increase in the peak value decreases the hazard rate of retiring by 0.08
percentage points.34 The coeﬃcients on the interaction term keep on being very close to zero,
meaning that workers respond to Social Security incentives in a similar way over the entire
period. In column 4 shows that after-tax accruals do not change these results. Most treatment
eﬀects are very close to zero, but with relatively large standard errors. The coeﬃcients on the
SSW are positive but not signiﬁcant. The coeﬃcients on the SSW show an increase in the
post-Statement period, but again not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
All the alternative speciﬁcations tried give similar results: controlling for time only linearly;
computing Social Security incentives with a 7 percent discount rate instead of a 3 percent one;
computing Social Security incentives assuming that workers do not take dependent spouse’s
beneﬁts into account; computing Social Security incentives based only on the beneﬁts received
at age 62, at the NRA, and at age 70, which are the beneﬁt levels shown in the Statement;
correcting Social Security incentives for the worker’s subjective probability of survival. I also
tried to interact “contacting SSA” with the Statement dummy, despite its endogeneity and
there is no evidence of larger responsiveness to the incentives upon receipt of a Statement for
those who didn’t contact SSA. To avoid the endogeneity issue I tried to condition the sample
to workers who are predicted to be less likely to have contacted the SSA, but again there was
no evidence of signiﬁcant treatment eﬀects.
In sum, despite having the right sign, none of the “treatment” eﬀects is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
34? estimate a similar regression, though they use a probit and the PV and ﬁnd a marginal eﬀect of 0.7
percent for the accrual.
23from zero, and I cannot rule out that the Statement did not alter workers’ retirement behavior.
It is certainly unlikely that it made workers a lot more responsive to Social Security incentives.
Let me stress that these results do not mean that information plays no role for workers’
retirement behavior. They simply cast some doubts on the possibility that by just giving
additional information, even when this information gets absorbed, workers will change their
behavior. Notice that these results are not in contrast with ?’s ones that workers respond
to their own expectations. One could simply add that ?’s result would probably be stronger
when workers have to incur some cost to generate these expectations. Finally, workers might
disregard the new information because those that did not get informed before are unable to use
the additional information to derive forward-looking incentives.
5 Conclusions
There is empirical evidence that a worker’s retirement decision responds to forward-looking re-
tirement incentives. These incentives depend on current and future earnings, and on retirement
beneﬁts. Social Security beneﬁts, which represent the most important source of retirement in-
come, are a complicated function lifetime earnings. It is generally assumed that workers know
their beneﬁts and are able to compute their retirement incentives.
In order to understand whether this is a reasonable assumption I analyze workers’ knowl-
edge. Contacting the SSA represents the single most important channel through which workers
learn about their future beneﬁts. I model the probability of contacting the SSA and ﬁnd evi-
dence that is consistent with the existence of considerable costs of collecting (and processing)
information about Social Security beneﬁts: Workers who, for various reasons (health, liquidity,
etc.), face simple retirement decisions are less likely to contact the SSA. Additional evidence
conﬁrming this result comes from the 1995 introduction of the Social Security Statements.
These Statements, which contain an estimate of the worker’s beneﬁts if he/she retires at age
62, 65, and 70, generate an exogenous variation in the cost of obtaining information. Upon
receiving a Statement workers are more likely to be able to provide a beneﬁt estimate and their
beneﬁt estimate tends to be more precise. Controlling for the endogeneity of the decision to
24contact the SSA, I ﬁnd that the whole improvement is concentrated among those workers who
don’t contact the SSA.
Then I turn to study how this additional information aﬀects workers’ retirement behavior.
The introduction of the Statement doesn’t improve the overall responsiveness to the retirement
incentives. While this might at ﬁrst seem disappointing given the 36 cents per Statement
spent by the SSA, it might either mean that workers are already behaving optimally, with
the marginal workers having only very small additional beneﬁts from getting informed, or
that the information contained in Statement is not suﬃcient to improve workers’ retirement
behavior.35 This calls for additional research. Moreover, the Statement might still improve the
workers’ ability to smooth their consumption upon retirement if workers become less likely to
be positively or negatively surprised by the amount of the beneﬁts, given that these surprises
act like unexpected changes in permanent income. This possibility also needs to be researched.
One way to improve the information required to make better retirement decisions is to provide
forecasted beneﬁts at all 9 possible claiming ages, instead of just at 62, at the NRA, and at 70.
Moreover, the Statement provides workers with information about their beneﬁts, but it does
not calculate a worker’s SSW. If this weakens the beneﬁcial eﬀect of the Statement, a possible
addition to the Statement could be a table that helps workers calculate their SSW. Since the
SSA cannot possibly use individual–speciﬁc mortality rates, one easy way to circumvent this
problem would be to construct a two-way table that contains “suggested” retirement ages as a
function of a worker’s expected own and spouse’s life–expectancy.
35The Social Security Statement experiment is certainly not as straightforward as providing consumers with























































































































































Figure 1: Monthly forecast error
Notes: Epanechnikov kernel estimate using a
$35 bandwidth. Sample: HRS 1992-1996, age 55-65. The upper
ﬁgures are unconditional errors, while the lower ones are residual errors after conditioning on year, age, age
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Figure 2: Probability of claiming within a month of one’s date of birth
Source: Master Beneﬁciary records.
27Table 1: Linear probability model of contacting the SSA.
(1) (2) (3)
(age − 55) × 1/2 8.16*** 7.75*** 7.37***
(0.80) (1.22) (1.26)
Female 1.62 0.13 -0.53
(2.55) (4.01) (4.36)
Below high school -10.68*** -14.19*** -12.97***
(2.92) (3.82) (3.93)
Some college 6.05* -1.28 -2.30
(3.16) (4.25) (4.43)
College 9.79*** 8.24** 6.99
(3.18) (4.05) (4.51)
Single -2.15 -1.69 0.72
(5.58) (7.97) (7.95)
Black -7.73** -2.94 -5.78
(3.37) (4.67) (4.71)
Self–r. health: very good 2.17 0.30 -0.83
(2.69) (3.82) (3.90)
good 3.31 2.36 1.54
(2.86) (3.91) (4.02)
fair 4.27 5.96 6.24
(3.85) (5.80) (5.90)
poor -11.40* -27.19*** -25.06***
(6.02) (5.72) (6.07)
Wealth percentiles: 25-50 10.58*** 7.78** 8.52**
(2.71) (3.81) (3.95)
50-75 18.98*** 18.42*** 18.00***
(3.04) (4.32) (4.46)
75-100 17.05*** 20.32*** 21.52***
(3.38) (4.61) (4.86)








few years -10.56* -11.74**
(5.64) (5.84)
5-10 years -5.72 -7.23
(5.72) (5.94)
Occupation dummies no no yes
Observations 5466 2346 2190
R-squared 0.14 0.16 0.18
Notes: Clustered (by individual) standard errors in parentheses. Sample: HRS
1992-1994, age 55-65. The excluded categories are workers with a high school (HS)
degree, in excellent health, with net wealth in the ﬁrst quartile, and a ﬁnancial
time horizon of more than 10 years. The subjective probability of surviving until
age 75, P75, is divided by the implied probability from the Vital Statistics life
tables that someone of the respondent’s age and gender will live to be 75. 28Table 2: Linear probability (in percent) model of being unable to provide a beneﬁt estimate.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Does not report an expected beneﬁt amount
Actual Treatment Placebo
Post-statement -6.25*** -4.48* -1.72 7.29 -2.07 6.22
(2.00) (2.64) (2.46) (4.54) (2.54) (5.59)
No SSA contact 28.56*** 27.47***
(2.40) (2.40)
Post times no SSA c. -10.01*** -10.32***
(2.90) (2.89)
Female 10.11*** 10.09*** 9.53*** 9.53*** 9.48*** 9.80***
(1.83) (1.80) (2.13) (2.10) (1.88) (1.85)
Below High School 11.10*** 7.59*** 11.20*** 8.79*** 10.87*** 7.92***
(2.35) (2.36) (2.82) (2.84) (2.45) (2.45)
Some college -1.96 -1.79 -2.03 -2.02 -2.79 -2.53
(2.09) (2.08) (2.35) (2.33) (2.15) (2.14)
College -1.14 0.57 1.08 2.06 -0.76 0.73
(2.05) (2.09) (2.28) (2.30) (2.17) (2.21)
Single 6.33 4.78 6.48 4.04 2.99 1.22
(4.28) (4.24) (6.28) (6.32) (4.33) (4.22)
Black 14.15*** 11.45*** 9.14*** 7.53** 13.63*** 11.32***
(2.62) (2.62) (3.11) (3.10) (2.74) (2.77)
Year, Wealth, Health eﬀects No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 5323 5323 3517 3517 4174 4174
R-squared 0.047 0.062 0.112 0.122 0.057 0.068
Notes: 34 percent of the respondents are unable to provide a beneﬁt estimate. The excluded educational
category is high school. All regressions control for age ﬁxed eﬀects. The regressions that don’t control
for year ﬁxed eﬀects control for years linearly. The Placebo Statement simulates the exact same
scheduling of the Statement but 4 years post the true one. Clustered (by individual) standard errors in
parentheses; bootstrapping (using 200 rep.) the standard errors by individual to account for both
clustering, and also for the variation due to the ﬁrst-step estimation of the probabilities of
misclassiﬁcation of contacting the SSA has negligible eﬀects on the standard errors (results available
upon request). * signiﬁcant at 5 percent; ** signiﬁcant at 1 percent.
Treatment Sample: HRS 1992-2000, age 55-65. Placebo Sample: HRS 1996-2002, age 55-65.
29Table 3: Linear probability (in percent) model of not being able to
provide a Social Security beneﬁts estimate by age.
Contacted SSA Did not contact SSA
Age Contacted SSA Pre-SSS Pre-Post Pre-SSS Pre-Post
55 0.28 21.18*** -5.49 50.78*** -4.95
(3.80) (9.98) (2.90) (9.88)
56 0.31 17.54*** 4.32 52.33*** -0.27
(3.63) (9.30) (3.05) (8.65)
57 0.30 19.36*** -4.16 47.49*** 12.50**
(3.23) (6.08) (2.71) (6.32)
58 0.42 22.53*** -10.24** 52.53*** -7.76
(3.37) (4.50) (3.67) (4.89)
59 0.42 19.07*** 4.50 56.81*** -15.36***
(3.32) (4.39) (3.62) (4.49)
60 0.39 15.04*** -1.84 57.11*** -12.35**
(3.05) (3.81) (4.04) (5.01)
61 0.55 9.94*** 7.89** 57.50*** -19.20***
(2.29) (3.29) (4.53) (5.14)
62 0.59 12.15*** 3.19 57.14*** -21.07***
(3.17) (4.21) (5.93) (6.97)
63 0.66 11.59*** 3.21 52.63*** -17.09*
(3.87) (4.81) (8.12) (8.84)
64 0.67 14.29 -1.73 33.33** 1.50
(9.38) (9.51) (15.76) (16.39)
Notes: The regression controls for gender, education, experience, and veteran
status. The ﬁrst column reports the fraction contacting the SSA. “Pre”
columns report the fraction of workers who do not provide an estimate
during the Pre–Statement period. Pre–Post columns report changes in the
probability of providing a beneﬁt estimate. Fractions are computed
separately for workers who contacted (ﬁrst two columns) and those who
didn’t contact the SSA (last two columns). Clustered (by individual)
standard errors in parentheses. Bootstrapping (using 200 rep.) the standard
errors by individual to account for both clustering, and for the variation due
to the ﬁrst-step estimation of the probabilities of misclassiﬁcation of
contacting the SSA has negligible eﬀects on the signiﬁcance level (results
available upon request). * signiﬁcant at 5 percent; ** signiﬁcant at 1 percent.
Sample: HRS 1992-2000, age 55-64.
30Table 4: Variance ratio test
Did not contact SSA Contacted SSA
Standard Dev. p-value Standard Dev. p-value
Pre-SSS Post-SSS Pre/Post Pre-SSS Post-SSS Pre/Post
Forecast error truncated at:
|e| < $1000 477.24 330.26 0.000 626.15 759.22 1.000
[625] [265] [779] [254]
|e| < $500 226.93 204.17 0.032 182.42 171.40 0.125
[518] [232] [701] [240]
|e| < $300 154.04 136.24 0.026 129.02 123.14 0.211
[398] [196] [610] [213]
Notes: Standard deviation of the errors and p-value of a variance ratio test with null-hypothesis
H0 : Vpre/Vpost < 1. Estimates control for the improvement in the standard deviation of the forecast error
that is independent of the Statement by using the dashed line version of Figure 1 for the pre-Statement
period. Since variances are highly sensitive to outliers I test the null using three truncated versions of the
forecast error. Numbers of observations in square brackets. Sample: HRS 1992-1996, age 55-65.
Table 5: Summary statistics of Social Security Incentives
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
Yearly percentage increase in beneﬁts (in %) 4.004 3.537 31563
Percentage accrual, 3%, single 0.05 2.592 31563
Percentage accrual, 3%, joint 0.523 2.526 31563
Accrual, 3%, single (
$1,000) -0.534 3.907 33118
Accrual, 3%, joint (
$1,000) 0.592 5.124 33118
Percentage after-tax accrual, 3%, single -1.468 2.279 31563
Percentage after-tax accrual, 3%, joint -0.758 2.238 31563
After-tax accrual, 3%, single (
$1,000) -2.65 4.035 33118
After-tax accrual, 3%, joint (
$1,000) -1.524 4.969 33118
Peak value, 3%, single (
$1,000) 3.003 8.833 33118
Peak value, 3%, joint (
$1,000) 10.117 18.45 33118
Social Security Wealth, 3%, joint (
$100,000) 1.747 1.115 33118
Spouse SSW at age 62 (
$100,000), 3% 0.34 0.557 33118
Forecasted real earnings (maximum) (
$1,000) 17.064 24.012 33118
31Table 6: Fraction of Respondents Receiving a Statement and Sample Size























1936 0.03 0.36 0.98
(273) (251) (237)




1939 0.02 0.36 0.99
(257) (250) (268)




Notes: The sample size is shown in parentheses. 56 percent of this sample received a Statement.
32Table 7: Pre-Post Statement model of retirement.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Self-reported retirement hazard
Yearly percentage increase in beneﬁts -0.52***
(0.20)
interacted with the Statement -0.11
(0.23)
Percentage accrual, 3%, married -0.63***
(0.23)
interacted with the Statement -0.03
(0.31)
Accrual, 3%, married -0.49*
(0.28)
interacted with the Statement -0.04
(0.29)
Percentage after-tax accrual, 3%, married -0.88***
(0.33)
interacted with the Statement 0.12
(0.38)
Peak value, 3%, married -0.08***
(0.03)
interacted with the Statement -0.01
(0.04)
Social Security Wealth, 3% 1.07 1.75 2.72 1.98 0.83
(2.18) (2.17) (2.25) (2.17) (2.23)
interacted with the Statement 0.27 0.28 0.33 0.28 0.27
(0.80) (0.81) (0.85) (0.81) (1.05)
Forecasted real earnings (maximum) -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.06*** -0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Statement -1.07 -1.35 -1.41 -1.37 -1.29
(1.54) (1.58) (1.48) (1.47) (1.50)
N.obs 5986 5986 5986 5986 5986
R-squared 0.064 0.064 0.064 0.064 0.064
Notes: All Social Security incentives are expressed in real 2003 dollars. All regressions additionally control for
real AIME, spouse’s real AIME, age dummies, year, year squared, industry and occupation dummies, and
self-reported health dummies. Clustered (by individual) standard errors in parentheses; * signiﬁcant at 5
percent; ** signiﬁcant at 1 percent. Sample: HRS linked to administrative data highlighted in Table 6.
33A Data
I use the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) to evaluate how the Statement aﬀects workers’
knowledge about their future beneﬁts, and to evaluate what determines whether workers are
informed even before receiving the Statement. The data are then matched to administrative
records from the SSA to evaluate the eﬀect of the Statement on retirement decisions.
The HRS is a longitudinal, biennial, nationally representative survey of older Americans. I
use waves 1 to 6 (1992–2000), and restrict the analysis to workers older than age 55 and younger
than age 70 who are not receiving Social Security disability beneﬁts. I also restrict the sample
to workers who are in the labor force in 1992, and drop workers from the sample if they die.
I restrict the analysis to workers born between 1922 and 1941.36 Workers are matched with
their spouses’ information. Some workers have expected beneﬁts that are smaller than half of
the beneﬁts of their spouse. These workers are excluded from the analysis since they are better
oﬀ by claiming for their spouses’ beneﬁts, and are unlikely to respond to changes in their own
SSW. Table 8 in the Appendix shows the summary statistics for the HRS sample used in the
regressions.
36Some further deletions are made mostly for reasons of miscellaneous data inconsistencies.
34Table 8: Randomization Test
Pre-Statement Unconditional post-pre Conditional post-pre
Average SE Average SE Average SE
Age 58.26*** (0.05) 1.28*** (0.05)
Year -0.70*** (0.02) 1.31*** (0.02)
Female 0.34*** (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.02)
Married 0.96*** (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.01)
Spouse in inactive 0.38*** (0.01) 0.03*** (0.01) -0.02 (0.02)
Independent spouse 0.68*** (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.02)
Experience 36.02*** (0.19) 1.38*** (0.17) -0.41 (0.31)
No kids 0.05*** (0.00) -0.01*** (0.00) 0.02*** (0.01)
Black 0.11*** (0.01) -0.00 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01)
High school 0.34*** (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) -0.01 (0.02)
Some college 0.21*** (0.01) -0.00 (0.01) -0.00 (0.02)
College 0.22*** (0.01) -0.00 (0.01) 0.02 (0.02)
Veteran 0.35*** (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) -0.02 (0.02)
SR health status:
very good 0.35*** (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) -0.02 (0.02)
good 0.31*** (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) -0.03* (0.02)
fair 0.10*** (0.01) 0.02** (0.01) 0.02* (0.01)
poor 0.02*** (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) -0.01* (0.00)
Spouse’s age-own age -0.13*** (0.03) -0.04 (0.04) 0.12** (0.06)
Real AIME 2,167.88*** (25.90) -1.04 (21.95) 8.30 (43.27)




1.49*** (0.02) 0.06*** (0.02) -0.01 (0.03)
Spouse SSW (
$100,000) 0.47*** (0.01) -0.05*** (0.01) -0.01 (0.02)
Expected wage 20.72*** (0.57) -0.05 (0.48) -0.05 (0.98)
Hazard rate 4.44*** (0.39) 1.56*** (0.57) -1.21 (1.02)
Yearly percentage increase
in beneﬁts (in %)
1.96*** (0.06) 0.63*** (0.07) -0.02 (0.06)
Percentage accrual, single 0.91*** (0.04) -0.09** (0.04) -0.01 (0.06)
Percentage accrual, joint 1.07*** (0.04) -0.00 (0.04) -0.04 (0.07)
Accrual, single (
$1,000) 0.81*** (0.04) -0.07 (0.05) 0.03 (0.05)
Accrual, joint (
$1,000) 1.44*** (0.06) 0.08 (0.07) -0.09 (0.10)
Peak value, single (
$1,000) 6.61*** (0.21) -1.01*** (0.17) 0.09 (0.32)
Peak value, joint (
$1,000) 15.93*** (0.43) -1.82*** (0.36) -0.45 (0.69)
Notes: Each line refers to a diﬀerent regression. The “row” variable is ﬁrst regressed on just a Statement
dummy. The ﬁrst column shows the estimated constant term, the second the estimate of the post-pre
diﬀerence. In the third column I additionally control for year, year squared, and for age dummies.
Clustered (by individual) standard errors in parentheses; * signiﬁcant at 5 percent; ** signiﬁcant at 1
percent. Sample: 5,986 observation selected in Table 6.
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Your Estimated Benefits ￿ To  qual i f y  f or   benef i t s ,   you  ear n  “ cr edi t s ”   t hr ough  your  
wor k— up  t o  f our   each  year .   Thi s   year ,   f or   exam pl e,   you 
ear n  one  cr edi t   f or   each  $900  of   wages   or   s el f - em pl oym ent  
i ncom e.   W hen  you’ ve  ear ned  $3, 600,   you’ ve  ear ned  your  
f our   cr edi t s   f or   t he  year .   Mos t   peopl e  need  40  cr edi t s ,  
ear ned  over   t hei r   wor ki ng  l i f et i m e,   t o  r ecei ve  r et i r em ent  
benef i t s .   For   di s abi l i t y  and  s ur vi vor s   benef i t s ,   young  peopl e 
need  f ewer   cr edi t s   t o  be  el i gi bl e.
W e  checked  your   r ecor ds   t o  s ee  whet her   you  have  ear ned 
enough  cr edi t s   t o  qual i f y  f or   benef i t s .   I f   you  haven’ t   ear ned 
enough  yet   t o  qual i f y  f or   any  t ype  of   benef i t ,   we  can’ tgi ve 
you  a  benef i t   es t i m at e  now.   I f   you  cont i nue  t o  wor k,   we’ l l  
gi ve  you  an  es t i m at e  when  you  do  qual i f y .
What we assumed— I f   you  have  enough  wor k  cr edi t s ,  
wees t i m at ed  your   benef i t   am ount s   us i ng  your   aver age 
ear ni ngs   over   your   wor ki ng  l i f et i m e.   For   2004  and  l at er  
( upt o  r et i r em ent   age) ,   we  as s um ed  you’ l l   cont i nue  t o  wor k 
and  m ake  about   t he  s am e  as   you  di d  i n  2002  or   2003.  
W eal s o  i ncl uded  cr edi t s   we  as s um ed  you  ear ned  l as t   year  
and  t hi s   year .  
W e  can’ t   pr ovi de  your   act ual   benef i t   am ount   unt i l   you 
appl y  f or   benef i t s .   And that amount may differ from the 
estimates stated below because:  
(1) Your earnings may increase or decrease in the future.
( 2) Your   es t i m at ed  benef i t s   ar e  bas ed  on  cur r ent   l aw.  
Thelaw governing benefit amounts may change.*
( 3) Your   benef i t   am ount   m ay  be  af f ect ed  by  military 
service, railroad employment or pensions earned 
through work on which you did not pay Social Security 
tax. Visit www.socialsecurity.gov/mystatement to 
seewhether your Social Security benefit amount will 
beaffected.
Gener al l y ,   es t i m at es   f or   ol der   wor ker s   ar e  m or e 
accur at et han  t hos e  f or   younger   wor ker s   becaus e  t hey’ r e 
bas ed  on  a  l onger   ear ni ngs   hi s t or y  wi t h  f ewer   uncer t ai nt i es  
s uch  as   ear ni ngs   f l uct uat i ons   and  f ut ur e  l aw  changes .
Thes e  es t i m at es   ar e  i n  t oday’ s   dol l ar s .   Af t er   you 
s t ar tr ecei vi ng  benef i t s ,   t hey  wi l l   be  adj us t ed  f or   cos t - of -
l i vi ngi ncr eas es .
￿ *Retirement You  have  ear ned  enough  cr edi t s   t o  qual i f y  f or   benef i t s .   At   your   cur r ent   ear ni ngs   r at e,  
i f   you  s t op  wor ki ng  and  s t ar t   r ecei vi ng  benef i t s …
At   age  62,   your   paym ent   woul d  be  about … $882  a  m ont h
I f   you  cont i nue  wor ki ng  unt i l . . .
      your   f ul l   r et i r em ent   age  ( 67  year s ) ,   your   paym ent   woul d  be  about … $1, 278  a  m ont h
      age  70,   your   paym ent   woul d  be  about … $1, 594  a  m ont h
￿ *Disability You  have  ear ned  enough  cr edi t s   t o  qual i f y  f or   benef i t s .   I f   you  becam e  di s abl ed  r i ght   now,
Your   paym ent   woul d  be  about … $1, 169  a  m ont h
￿ *Family I f   you  get   r et i r em ent   or   di s abi l i t y  benef i t s ,   your   s pous e  and  chi l dr en  al s o  m ay  qual i f y  f or  
benef i t s .
￿ *Survivors You  have  ear ned  enough  cr edi t s   f or   your   f am i l y  t o  r ecei ve  s ur vi vor s   benef i t s .   I f   you  di e  t hi s  
year ,   cer t ai n  m em ber s   of   your   f am i l y  may  qual i f y  f or   t he  f ol l owi ng  benef i t s .  
Your   chi l d… $911  a  m ont h
Your   s pous e  who  i s   car i ng  f or   your   chi l d… $911  a  m ont h
Your   s pous e,   i f   benef i t s   s t ar t   at   f ul l   r et i r em ent   age… $1, 215  a  m ont h
Tot al   f am i l y  benef i t s   cannot   be  m or e  t han… $2, 233  a  m ont h
Your   s pous e  or   m i nor   chi l d  m ay  be  el i gi bl e  f or   a  s peci al   one- t i m e  deat h  benef i t   of   $255.
￿ Medicare You  have  enough  cr edi t s   t o  qual i f y  f or   Medi car e  at   age  65.   Even  i f   you  do  not   r et i r e  at   age  65,   be 
s ur e  t o  cont act   Soci al   Secur i t y  t hr ee  m ont hs   bef or e  your   65t h  bi r t hday  t o  enr ol l   i n  Medi car e.
We based your benefit estimates on these facts:
Your   nam e. . . W anda  W or ker
Your   dat e  of   bi r t h. . . May  5,   1963
Your   es t i m at ed  t axabl e  ear ni ngs
per   year   af t er   2003. . .   $35, 051
Your   Soci al   Secur i t y  num ber   ( onl y  t he  l as t   four digits
are shown to help prevent identity theft)... XXX-XX-2004
*Your estimated benefits are based on current law. Congress has made changes to the law in the past and can do so at 
any time. The law governing benefit amounts may change because, by 2042, the payroll taxes collected will be 
enough to pay only about 73 percent of scheduled benefits.
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Help Us Keep Your Earnings Record Accurate ￿
Total Social Security and Medicare taxes paid over your working career through the last year reported on the chart above:
Es t i m at ed  t axes   pai d  f or   Soci al   Secur i t y: Es t i m at ed  t axes   pai d  f or   Medi car e:
You  pai d: $24, 723 You  pai d: $5, 820
Your   em pl oyer s   pai d:   $24, 723 Your   em pl oyer s   pai d: $5, 820
Note:  You currently pay 6.2 percent of your salary, up to $87,900, in Social Security taxes and 1.45 percent in Medicare taxes 
on your entire salary. Your employer also pays 6.2 percent in Social Security taxes and 1.45 percent in Medicare taxes for you. 
If you are self-employed, you pay the combined employee and employer amount of 12.4 percent in Social Security taxes and 
2.9 percent in Medicare taxes on your net earnings.
Your Earnings Record at a Glance
Year s   You
W or ked
Your   Taxed
Soci al   Secur i t y
Ear ni ngs




1980 1, 123 1, 123
1981 1, 983 1, 983
1982 3, 293 3, 293
1983 4, 461 4, 461
1984 5, 600 5, 600
1985 6, 950 6, 950
1986 8, 813 8, 813
1987 10, 941 10, 941
1988 12, 803 12, 803
1989 14, 520 14, 520
1990 16, 308 16, 308
1991 17, 920 17, 920
1992 19, 655 19, 655
1993 20, 534 20, 534
1994 21, 730 21, 730
1995 23, 155 23, 155
1996 24, 838 24, 838
1997 26, 806 26, 806
1998 28, 720 28, 720
1999 30, 824 30, 824
2000 33, 060 33, 060
2001 34, 237 34, 237
2002 35, 051 35, 051
2003 Not   yet   r ecor ded
Did you know… Social Security is more than 
just a retirement program? It’s here to help you 
when you need it most.
You  and  your   f am i l y  m ay  be  el i gi bl e  f or   val uabl e 
benef i t s :
￿ W hen  you  di e,   your   f am i l y  m ay  be  el i gi bl e  t o 
r ecei ve  s ur vi vor s   benef i t s .
￿ Soci al   Secur i t y  m ay  hel p  you  i f   you  becom e
di s abl ed— even  at   a  young  age.  
￿ I t   i s   pos s i bl e  f or   a  young  per s on  who  has  
wor ked  and  pai d  Soci al   Secur i t y  t axes   i n  as  
f ew  as   t wo  year s   t o  becom e  el i gi bl e  f or  
di s abi l i t ybenef i t s .
Soci al   Secur i t y  cr edi t s   you  ear n  m ove  wi t h  you 
f r om   j ob  t o  j ob  t hr oughout   your   car eer .
You,   your   em pl oyer   and  Soci al   Secur i t y  s har e 
r es pons i bi l i t y  f or   t he  accur acy  of   your   ear ni ngs   r ecor d.
Si nce  you  beganwor ki ng,   we  r ecor ded  your   r epor t ed 
ear ni ngs   under   your   nam e  and  Soci al   Secur i t y  num ber .   W e 
have  updat ed  your   r ecor d  each  t i m e  your   em pl oyer   ( or  
you,   i f   you’ r e  s el f - em pl oyed)   r epor t ed  your   ear ni ngs .
Rem em ber ,   i t ’ s   your   ear ni ngs ,   not   t he  am ount   of   t axes  
you  pai d  or   t he  num ber   of   cr edi t s   you’ ve  ear ned,   t hat  
det er m i ne  your   benef i t   am ount .   W hen  we  f i gur e  t hat  
am ount ,   we  bas e  i ton  your   aver age  ear ni ngs   over   your  
l i f et i m e.   I f   our   r ecor ds   ar e  wr ong,   you  m ay  not   r ecei ve  al l  
t he  benef i t s   t o  whi ch  you’ r e  ent i t l ed.
￿ Review this chart carefully us i ng  your   own  r ecor ds   t o 
m ake  s ur e  our   i nf or m at i on  i s   cor r ect   and  t hat   we’ ve 
r ecor ded  each  year   you  wor ked.   You  ar e  t he  onl y 
per s onwho  can  l ook  at   t he  ear ni ngs   char t   and  know 
whet her   i ti scom pl et e  and  cor r ect .
Som e  or   al l   of   your   ear ni ngs   f r om   last year  m ay  not  
be  s hown  on  your   Statement.   I t   coul d  be  t hat   we  s t i l l  
wer e  pr oces s i ng  l as t   year ’ s   ear ni ngs   r epor t s   when  your  
Statement  was   pr epar ed.   Your   com pl et e  ear ni ngs   f or  
l as t   year   wi l l   be  s hown  on  next   year ’ s   Statement.Note:
I f   you  wor ked  f or   m or e  t han  one  em pl oyer   dur i ngany 
year ,   or   i f   you  had  bot h  ear ni ngs   and  s el f - em pl oym ent  
i ncom e,   we  com bi ned  your   ear ni ngs   f or   t he  year .
￿ There’s a limit on the amount of earnings on 
which you pay Social Security taxes each year.   The 
l i m i t   i ncr eas es   year l y .   Ear ni ngs   above  t he  l i m i t   wi l l  
not   appear   on  your   ear ni ngs   char t   as   Soci al   Secur i t y 
ear ni ngs .   ( For   Medi car e  t axes ,   t he  m axi m um   ear ni ngs  
am ountbegan  r i s i ng  i n  1991.   Si nce  1994,   all  of   your  
ear ni ngs   ar e  t axed  f or   Medi car e. )
￿ Call us right away  at1–800–772–1213  ( 7a. m . –7p. m .  
your   l ocal   t i m e)   i fany  ear ni ngs   f or   year s   before last 
year  ar e  s hown  i ncor r ect l y .   I f   pos s i bl e,   have  your   W- 2  or  
t ax  r et ur n  f or   t hos e  year s   avai l abl e.   ( I f   you  l i ve  out s i de  t he 
U. S. ,   f ol l ow  t he  di r ect i ons   at   t he  bot t om   of   page  4. )
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Some Facts About Social Security ￿
About Social Security and Medicare…
Soci al   Secur i t y  pays   r et i r em ent ,   di s abi l i t y ,   f am i l y  and 
s ur vi vor s   benef i t s .   Medi car e,   a  s epar at e  pr ogr am   r un  by 
t he  Cent er s   f or   Medi car e  and  Medi cai d  Ser vi ces ,   hel ps  
pay  f or   i npat i ent   hos pi t al   car e,   nur s i ng  car e,   doct or s ’  
f ees ,   and  ot her   m edi cal   s er vi ces   and  s uppl i es   t o  peopl e  age 
65  and  ol der ,   or   t o  peopl e  who  have  been  r ecei vi ng 
Soci alSecur i t y  di s abi l i t y  benef i t s   f or   t wo  year s   or   m or e.  
YourSoci al   Secur i t y  cover ed  ear ni ngs   qual i f y  you 
f orbot h  pr ogr am s .
  Here are some facts about Social Security’s benefits:
￿ Retirement— I f   you  wer e  bor n  bef or e  1938,   your  
f ul lr et i r em ent   age  i s   65.   Becaus e  of   a  1983  change 
i n t he  l aw,   t he  f ul l   r et i r em ent   age  wi l l   i ncr eas e 
gr adual l y  t o  67  f or   peopl e  bor n  i n  1960  and  l at er .  
Som e  peopl e  r et i r e  bef or e  t hei r   f ul l   r et i r em ent  
age.You  can  r et i r e  as   ear l y  as   age  62  and  t ake  your  
benef i t sat   a  r educed  r at e.   I f   you  cont i nue  wor ki ng 
af t er   your   f ul l   r et i r em ent   age,   you  can  r ecei ve  hi gher  
benef i t s   becaus e  of   addi t i onal   ear ni ngs   and  s peci al  
cr edi t s   f or   del ayed  r et i r em ent .
￿ Disability— I f   you  becom e  di s abl ed  bef or e  f ul l  
r et i r em entage,   you  can  r ecei ve  di s abi l i t y  benef i t s  
af t er   s i x  m ont hs   i f   you  have:
—   enough  cr edi t s   f r om   ear ni ngs   ( dependi ng  on 
your   age,   you  m us t   have  ear ned  s i x  t o  20  of   your  
cr edi t s   i n  t he  t hr ee  t o  10  year s   bef or e  you  becam e 
di s abl ed) ;   and
— a  phys i cal   or   m ent al   i m pai r m ent   t hat   i s   expect ed
t opr event   you  f r om   doi ng  “ s ubs t ant i al ”   wor k 
f ora  year   or   m or e,   or  r es ul t   i n  deat h.  
￿ Family— I f   you’ r e  el i gi bl e  f or   di s abi l i t y  or  
r et i r em entbenef i t s ,   your   cur r ent   or   di vor ced 
s pous e,   m i nor   chi l dr en,   or   adul t   chi l dr en  di s abl ed 
bef or e  age  22  al s o  m ay  r ecei ve  benef i t s .   Each  m ay 
qual i f y  f or   up  t o  about   50  per cent   of   your   benef i t  
am ount .   The  t ot al   am ount   depends   on  how  m any 
f am i l y  m em ber s   qual i f y .
￿ Survivors— W hen  you  di e,   cer t ai n  m em ber s   of  
yourf am i l y  m ay  be  el i gi bl e  f or   benef i t s :
—   your   s pous e  age  60  or   ol der   ( 50  or   ol der   i f  
di s abl ed,or   any  age  i f   car i ng  f or   your   chi l dr en 
younger   t han  age  16) ;   and
—   your   chi l dr en  i f   unm ar r i ed  and  younger   t han 
age18,   s t i l li n  s chool   and  younger   t han  19  year s   ol d,  
or   adul t   chi l dr en  di s abl ed  bef or e  age  22.
I f   you  ar e  di vor ced,   your   ex- s pous e  coul d  be 
el i gi bl ef or   a  wi dow’ s   or   wi dower ’ s   benef i t   on 
yourr ecor d  when  you  di e.
Receive benefits and still work...
You  can  cont i nue  t o  wor k  and  s t i l l   get   r et i r em ent   or  
s ur vi vor s   benef i t s .   I f   you’ r e  younger   t han  your   f ul l  
r et i r em entage,   t her e  ar e  l i m i t s   on  how  m uch  you  can  ear n 
wi t hout   af f ect i ng  your   benef i t   am ount .   The  l i m i t s  
change  each  year .   W hen  you  appl y  f or   benef i t s ,   we’ l l   t el l  
you  what   t he  l i m i t s   ar e  at   t hat   t i m e  and  whet her   wor k 
woul d  af f ect   your   m ont hl y  benef i t s .   W hen  you  r each  f ul l  
r et i r em ent   age,   t he  ear ni ngs   l i m i t s   no  l onger   appl y .
Before you decide to retire...
Thi nk  about   your   benef i t s   f or   t he  l ong  t er m .   Ever yone’ s  
s i t uat i on  i s   di f f er ent .   Forexam pl e,   be  s ur e  t o  cons i der  
t he  advant ages   and  di s advant agesof   ear l y  r et i r em ent .   I f  
you  choos e  t o  r ecei ve  benef i t s   bef or e  you  r each  f ul l  
r et i r em ent   age,   your   benef i t s   wi l l   be  per m anent l y 
r educed.   However ,   you’ l l   r ecei ve  benef i t s   f or   a  l onger  
per i od  of   t i m e.
To  hel p  you  deci de  when  i s   t he  bes t   t i m e  f or   you  t o 
r et i r e,   we  of f er   a  f r ee  bookl et ,   Social Security— 
Retirement Benefits  ( Publ i cat i on  No.   05- 10035) ,   t hat  
pr ovi dess peci f i c  i nf or m at i on  about   r et i r em ent .   You 
can  cal cul at e  f ut ur e  r et i r em ent   benef i t s   on  our   webs i t e 
atwww.socialsecurity.gov by  us i ng  t he  Social Security 
Benefit Calculators.   Ther e  ar e  ot her   f r ee  publ i cat i ons  
t hat   you  m ay  f i nd  hel pf ul ,i ncl udi ng:
￿ Understanding The Benefits  ( No.   05- 10024) — a 
gener alexpl anat i on  of   al l   Soci al   Secur i t y  benef i t s ;
￿ How Your Retirement Benefit Is Figured 
( No.   05- 10070) — an  expl anat i on  of   how  you 
cancal cul at e  your   benef i t ;
￿ The Windfall Elimination Provision ( No.   05- 10045) —
how  i t   af f ect s   your   r et i r em ent   or   di s abi l i t y  benef i t s ;  
￿ Government Pension Offset  ( No.   05- 10007) —
expl anat i onof   a  l aw  t hat   af f ect s   s pous e’ s   or  
wi dow( er ) ’ s   benef i t s ;   and
￿ When Someone Misuses Your Number ( No.   05- 10064) —
what   t o  do  i f   you’ r e  a  vi ct i m   of   i dent i t yt hef t .
W e  al s o  have  ot her   l eaf l et s   and  f act   s heet s   wi t h 
i nf or m at i onabout   s peci f i c  t opi cs   s uch  as   m i l i t ar y 
s er vi ce,s el f - em pl oym ent   or   f or ei gn  em pl oym ent .  
You can  r eques t   Soci al   Secur i t y  publ i cat i ons   at  
www.socialsecurity.gov  or   by  cal l i ng  us   at  
1–800–772–1213.
If you need more information—Vi s i t   www.socialsecurity.gov/mystatement  on  t he  I nt er net ,   cont act   any  Soci al   Secur i t y 
of f i ce,   cal l   1–800–772–1213  or   wr i t e  t o  Soci al   Secur i t y  Adm i ni s t r at i on,   Of f i ce  of   Ear ni ngs   Oper at i ons ,   P. O.   Box  33026,  
Bal t i m or e,   MD  21290- 3026.   I f   you’ r e  deaf   or   har d  of   hear i ng,   cal l   TTY  1–800–325–0778.   I f   you  have  ques t i ons   about  
your   per s onal   i nf or m at i on,   you  m us t   pr ovi de  your   com pl et e  Soci al   Secur i t y  num ber .   I f   your   addr es s   i s   i ncor r ect   on  t hi s  
Statement,   as k  t he  I nt er nal   Revenue  Ser vi ce  t o  s end  you  a  For m   8822.   W e  don’ t   keep  your   addr es s   i f   you’ r e  not  
r ecei vi ng  Soci al   Secur i t y  benef i t s .
Para solicitar una Declaración en español, llame al 1-800-772-1213.
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